Abstract-As an important application mode of Internet of Things, Machine-to-Machine (M2M) networks have gained more and more concerns. However, the security problems such as privacy protection and platform authentication in M2M networks are not fulfilled the requirements yet. Since the M2M devices are always assigned to desolate and uninhabited circumstances, it is vulnerable to be stolen or maliciously attacked by those adversary or hacker. Meanwhile, the limiting computational and storage capabilities of M2M device also restrain the application of complicated security scheme. The inter-domain platform authentication of M2M device belonged to different issuer is not fully resolved in those early literatures. In this paper, we propose a Lightweight Inter-domain Direct Anonymous Attestation (L-IDAA) scheme to solve the security problems in inter-domain M2M networks according to the features of them and the characters of the M2M devices. We build a M2M Certificate Authority system above the issuer domains, and use this CA system to assure the authenticity of Issuers and Verifiers in different DAA domains. The proposed scheme can remedy the security fault of those legacy inter-domain schemes and gain higher computational efficiency. The computational cost for TPM is reduced to 1G 1 2 and that for Host is reduced to 16G 1 +1G 1 2 . Finally, we use the ideal/real-system model to prove the security of L-IDAA scheme. The results show that the proposed L-IDAA scheme is feasible and is suitable for inter-domain anonymous attestation in M2M networks.
I. INTRODUCTION
In M2M networks, there are different independent trusted domains for Direct Anonymous Attestation (DAA) [1] . Every trusted domain has its own trusted DAA certificate issuer. The DAA certificate based on one Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is trusted only in its own domain, but not trusted in the other network domains. When the trusted platforms and the verifiers are in different domains, verifier in one trusted domain does not trust the certificates published in the other trusted domain. So, the traditional single-domain DAA protocols can't function normally in inter-domain circumstance [1, 2] . In M2M networks, there are large numbers of M2M end devices and they are dispersedly distributed in various environments. However, all these M2M end devices, which lie in different domains, generally need the inter-domain platform legality verification. It is necessary to propose a suitable DAA algorithm for M2M inter-domain anonymous attestation to meet the security demand of M2M inter-domain attestation [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] . Here, there has been no published literature related to inter-domain DAA scheme based on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystem (ECC). And that related to inter-domain attestation for M2M has not been found yet. Based on full consideration of the security needs and efficiency requirements of M2M networks, a Lightweight Inter-domain Direct Anonymous Attestation (L-IDAA) is proposed in this paper. With high security and efficiency, the proposed L-IDAA scheme, which is based on ECC-DAA mechanism [9] [10] [11] [12] , is suitable for M2M devices which have limited computational capability and transmission bandwidth. Moreover, it is an effective scheme to fulfill trusted platform attestation among different domains and bring wide application for M2M networks.
II. ANALYSIS AND COMPARISON OF THOSE EXISTING INTER-DOMAIN DAA SCHEMES
The BCC-DAA scheme presented in TPM specification v1.2 is only fit for those inner networks and single trusted domain. It can't provide identity authentication for the trusted platforms among different DAA trusted domains [1] . Then, an inter-domain DAA model is proposed in ref. [8] . It adds two entities in each authentication domain: passport issuer and visa issuer. HostA should first apply a passport certificate from its own certificate issuer and then apply a visa certificate from the visa issuer of Domain B. Only with possession of the two certificates, VerifierB in domain B can trust the identity of HostA. However, in ref. [8] , the specific solution on how the signing issuer of one domain trusts the passport issuer of another domain is not provided yet. In ref. [14] , issuers in two domains build agency relationship by exchanging their public keys in order to deal with the distrust between two domains. However, it is unreasonable for one trusted platform to apply certificates from different issuers with the same secret value. If TPM owns several certificates issued by different I ssuer at the same time, the secret values of the different certificates should not be the same. So, it is unreasonable to use the same secret value of domain A's certificate to issue Domain B's certificate. Consequently, the scheme of [14] can't solve the distrust problem among different trusted domains. Then, ref. [15] proposes a new scheme to solve the distrust problem among different trusted domains. It is based on the inter-domain authentication model of ref. [1] , and adds a third Trusted Auditor (TA) above DAA trusted domains. TAs in different domains mutually authenticates with each other and shares the same secret key K. Then, TA-A in domain A firstly verifies the DAA signature of TPM a and verifies whether the issuer which issues certificates is legal. If the issuer is legal and the DAA signature passes the verification, and TA-B obtains the signed certificate of domain A, TA-B will trust the publisher of domain A and verify the DAA signature of domain A.
Although ref. [15] uses a simple TA mechanism to solve the distrust problem among different trusted domains, it brings security risks while IssuerB issues certificates. As TPM uses different secret values for different publishers, TPM will use new secret value to generate the value comm which is signed with domain A's certificate. Then, TPM need to send the signature to IssuerB and the signed certificate to TA-B. Certainly, TA-B will verify domain A's signature instead of IssuerB. Though TA-B is able to verify whether comm is from a legal domain, it is impossible to confirm whether the platform that generates comm is the same as the one obtained from the signed certificate. In other words, it is impossible for TA-B to know whether the object, which it will issue certificate to, is the one that TA-A has verified. As Cert TA −A and the DAA signature of comm are separate and without any binding relationship, it is prone for a platform to steal Cert TA −A of another platform to apply domain B's DAA certificate. Finally, although ref. [13] proposes an inter-domain scheme, it is based on the agency signature and follows the RSA mechanism. It is low efficient.
We can see from above that no scheme has been proposed to realize a secure, practical and reliable inter-domain authentication for M2M networks. To achieve this goal, three problems should be considered. Firstly, the verifier of domain B should trust the DAA issuer of domain A. Secondly, after IssuerB succeeds the verification of domain A's local DAA signature, IssuerB can confirm the DAA certificate issuer and signed certificate are come from the same trusted platform. Thirdly, in the trusted platform, the secret values used to generate DAA certificates of domain A or domain B should not be the same. Those legacy inter-domain attestation algorithms are all based on the BCC-DAA scheme. According to the complex computation and low efficiency of BCC-DAA scheme, they are not fit for M2M devices and system at all. This paper designs a new M2M inter-domain attestation model at first. Then, based on this model, a new M2M lightweight inter-domain DAA (L-IDAA) scheme is proposed. Based on ECC-DAA scheme, the proposed L-IDAA not only meets the security needs and efficiency requirements, but also solves the three security problems mentioned above. The process of L-IDAA can be described as follows. Legal issuer needs to register in CA and get public certificates issued by CA. CA stores and manages the public certificates of all legal publishers. a simultaneously obtains the DAA certificate and IssuerA's public key certificate from a , which are shown when the platform applies Cert DAA-CA from CA. Firstly, CA verifies the a public key certificate. After confirming its legality and credibility, CA uses the public key to verify the DAA signature issued by a . If the verification are passed, L-IDAA-CA-Join protocol is implemented, which means that CA issues the signed certificate Cert DAA-CA to a .
protocol. a needs to prove the possession of the signed certificate issued by CA, and confirms that the secret value it provides to b and the signed certificate are owned by the same platform. Only with the two certificates at the same time, it is possible to generate the inter-domain DAA signature so that it can confirm platform's authenticity to verifiers of different domains.
IV. THE PROPOSED INTER-DOMAIN ANONYMOUS
ATTESTATION SCHEME-L-IDAA
A. L-IDAA-CA-Join Protocol
The protocol is implemented after the trusted platform in domain A fulfills L-IDAA-join protocol and obtains the DAA certificate issued by IssuerA. If the trusted platform needs to communicate with verifiers in other domains, it is necessary to first get the signed certificate Cert DAA −CA issued by CA.
The public parameters of CA system are( CA 1 , CA 2 , CA T , , CA 
B. L-IDAA-IssuerB-Join Protocol
This is an inter-domain protocol implemented between the trusted platform a in domain A and certificate issuer b in domain B. Based on this protocol, a gets the DAA certificate of domain B with which a is able to sign/verify with verifier in domain B.
The public parameters of IssuerB system are described as ( IB 1 , IB 2 , IB T , , IB 1 , IB 2 , IB 3 , IB 4 , , 1 , IB , IB ). Here, IB 1 = IB 1 , IB 2 = IB 2 , : IB 1 × IB 2  IB T . IB and IB are the public keys of IssuerB, IB and IB are the secret keys. IB = IB IB 2 ∈ IB 2 , IB = IB IB 2 ∈ IB 2 . Now the trusted platform a has owned the DAA certificate of domain A as Cert DAA −A and the signed certificate issued by CA is Cert DAA −CA . Because the secret value f have been used in application for Cert DAA −A , the next secret value k should be used in application for Cert DAA −B .
The L-IDAA-IssuerB-Join protocol is described as follows.
1 (2) TPM a chooses f ← q , T ← 0,1 t and calculates
Here, in the processing of IB signature, we can see that any computation relevant to f is only implemented by TPM a . The reason is that f is only known by TPM a and secret to HostA. As TPM a and HostA share k and Ident, they can fulfill computation requirement according to k and Ident. 
C. L-IDAA-Sign/Verify Protocol
This also is an inter-domain sign/verify protocol run between the trusted platform a in domain A and verifier in domain B. a makes an inter-domain signature with L-IDAA-Sign and then sends the signature to verifierB V b that will make an IDAA/Verify operation. Only passing the verification can a anonymously confirm its credibility to verifiers in different domains.
The trusted platform must own the signed certificate Cert DAA −CA issued by CA and the DAA certificate in domain B Cert DAA −B at the same time.
The L-IDAA/Sign process are described as follows. Finally, the processing of L-IDAA/Verify is described as follows.
1. The verifier computes str1 ← CA
